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Bridging the Gap Between Research and Practice: Predicting What Will Work Locally 
By Kathryn E. Joyce and Nancy Cartwright 
This essay addresses the gap between what works in research and what works in practice. Currently, 
research in evidence-based education policy and practice focuses on RCTs. These can support causal 
ascriptions (‘It worked’) but provide little basis for local effectiveness predictions (‘It will work here’) 
which are what matter for practice. We argue that moving from ascription to prediction by way of 
causal generalization (‘It works’) is unrealistic and urge focusing research efforts directly on how to 
build local effectiveness predictions. We outline various kinds of information that can improve 
predictions and encourage using methods better-equipped for acquiring that information. We 
compare our proposal with others advocating a better mix of methods, like ‘implementation 
science’, ‘improvement science’, and ‘practice-based evidence’. 
 
Keywords: causal claims, evidence-based education, educational research, RCTs, research-informed 
practice 
 
For nearly two decades the dominant model for evidence-based education (EBE) has 
focused on improving schools by researching ‘what works.’ Yet, anyone familiar with EBE 
recognizes its relentless adversary: the gap between research and practice (Coburn & Stein, 2010; 
Farley-Ripple et al., 2018; McIntyre, 2005; Nelson & Campbell, 2017; Tseng & Nutley, 2014). The 
challenge is how educators can use research results to improve their outcomes in practice. Despite 
efforts to bridge the gap, primarily by more effective dissemination of results from ‘high quality’ 
experimental research, interventions adopted on the basis of recommendations often fail to be 
effective in practice. Many respond by rejecting EBE in its current form or by denouncing the entire 
enterprise (e.g. Archibald, 2015; Biesta, 2007, 2010; Hammersley, 2002, 2013; Smeyers & Dapaepe, 
2007). Rather than opposing the dominant model, in which vast resources have been invested, we 
propose ways to shift and expand it to improve its performance. We begin with an analysis of why 
the gap exists and propose constructive advances to help bridge it. We argue that the research-
practice gap reflects a gap between the causal claims supported by the experimental research results 
generally favored in EBE —‘It worked’—and the causal claims that are relevant to practice—‘It will 
work here.’ Researchers may produce evidence to support the former, but those on the practice side 
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must figure out whether a program can work for them, and if so, what they need to put in place to 
get it to do so. But, so far, EBE has not been centrally concerned with producing and disseminating 
research that helps with this task. We conclude that addressing the gap requires a major rethinking 
of the research investigation and theory-building needed to support EBE and of the demands on 
research-users.  
Drawing on guidance for deliberating in other policy areas, especially child protection, we 
provide a catalogue of some things that can help research-users – educators and decision-makers in 
their home sites—make more reliable predictions about what might work, and how it might do so, 
for their school, their district, their students. Discussing the knowledge-use side of EBE carries 
implications for organizing the knowledge-production side and for knowledge-mobilization. Our 
principal contribution on the knowledge-production side is in diagnosing the gap and showing that 
bridging it requires dramatically expanding the kinds of evidence that are collected and disseminated 
by EBE and adjusting the methods used to judge its acceptability.  
EBE relies on researchers to produce evidence of effectiveness for educators to use in 
practice. Intermediary organizations like the What Works Clearinghouse (WWC) in the U.S., the 
What Works Network and Educational Endowment Foundation in the U.K., the European 
EIPPEE Network (Evidence Informed Policy and Practice in Education in Europe) are supposed to 
help bridge the gap between research and practice by evaluating research, summarizing results, and 
advertising interventions that have proven efficacious in rigorous experimental studies, especially 
randomized controlled trials (RCTs).  
Proponents of EBE commonly attribute the gap between outcomes in research and practice 
to deficiencies in how tasks are performed on one or both sides of the knowledge-production/ 
knowledge-use divide. Accordingly, plans for addressing it encourage researchers to conduct more 
relevant research, offer guidance for implementation (Gutiérrez & Penuel, 2014), translate “research-
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based knowledge into…generalized practical suggestions” (McIntyre, 2005, p. 364), and effectively 
communicate research findings to decision-makers in easily digestible formats and in ways that 
encourage use. For example, Levin (2013) explains that research findings must compete with 
information from other sources that influence potential users. He suggests using knowledge 
mobilization strategies that appreciate how experience, organizational practices, and attitudes shape 
educators’ engagement with research. On the practice, or knowledge-use, side, strategies generally 
emphasize the importance of cultivating evidence-literacy and exercising professional judgment 
when choosing and implementing interventions (Brown & Schildkamp & Hubers, 2017; Bryk, 2015).  
By contrast, we are concerned with the information and reasoning needed to bridge the gap between the 
kind of causal claim supported by research -- causal ascriptions -- and the kind of claims that are 
relevant to practice -- effectiveness generalizations and effectiveness predictions.  
RCT results, along with meta-analyses and systematic reviews of them, are taken across 
evidence-based policy communities as ‘gold-standard’ evidence for ‘what works’. There is much 
debate about this concentration on RCTs (see section I below). Our concerns are with sloppy talk. 
Currently, EBE is plagued by casual use of language that is imprecise about what kinds of causal 
claims are at stake and also about what kind of work it takes to warrant the kinds needed in practice. 
We will look carefully and critically at just what kinds of claims can (in the ideal) be warranted by 
RCTs and contrast that with the kinds of claims educators need to know. Then we will turn to the 
argument theory of evidence and the related material theory of induction to lay out what it takes, beyond the 
much discussed RCT, to provide evidence for claims that a policy ‘works’ generally or that it will 
work here.  
We shall defend the claim that RCTs can provide evidence for causal ascriptions— the 
intervention worked in the study population in the study setting. But, as the argument theory shows, 
it takes a great deal of additional knowledge besides an RCT result to warrant the claims educators 
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need – effectiveness generalizations and effectiveness predictions.  Yet, the WWC, like other organizations 
driving EBE, claim that “high-quality research” from RCTs can show “what works in education” 
and support “evidence-based decisions” (WWC, n.d.). Similarly, Connolly, et al. (2017), assert that 
“RCTs within education offer the possibility of developing a cumulative body of knowledge and an 
evidence base around the effectiveness of different practices, programmes, and policies” (p.11). Like 
other philanthropic organizations involved in social policy, the Gates Foundation calls for schools to 
use methods “grounded in data and evidence.” Their programs focus on “identifying new, effective 
approaches that can be replicated in other schools” and “using evidence-based interventions and 
data-driven approaches to support continuous learning” (Gates Foundation, n.d.). 
As these statements indicate, EBE aims to support predictions concerning how an evidence-
based intervention will perform in a new educational setting indirectly by establishing effectiveness 
generalizations. While generalizations would naturally justify predictions about specific cases, we argue 
that they are unnecessary. This is a good thing since there are few useful, reliable general 
effectiveness claims to be had. The kinds of claims that can be expected to hold widely in education, 
or even over restricted domains characterized by a handful of descriptors (inner-city, free-school 
lunches, ESL, high-achievers, etc.), are usually too abstract to guide practice. For example: Children 
learn better when they are well-nourished, have a secure environment, read at home, and have 
adequate health care.  
Instead of just trying to support local plans and predictions indirectly by establishing ‘what 
works,’ we argue that EBE should focus on research that supports these directly by producing 
evidence research-users can employ to make effectiveness predictions locally. We should note at the 
start that because context does significantly affect effectiveness, it will seldom be possible to 
replicate results by moving a program as implemented in study sites to new settings. If the program 
is to work in a context it will have to be fitted to that context, and this seldom involves just tinkering 
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around the edges or implementing it well. Rather it requires getting all the right features in place that 
will allow the program to work here and guarding against features that can derail it here. So, the work 
is harder than one might hope: If the program is to be effective, a context-local program-plan must 
be built. And to build a program-plan that you can expect to be effective for the goals you want to 
achieve in a specific context, you need to know what facts make it likely that the program will work 
here.  Since just what these facts are can vary from context to context, often dramatically, there’s no 
telling in advance what they will be. But we can tell what kinds of facts matter.  To this end, we will 
outline a variety of kinds of information that can guide local planning and make local predictions 
about the effectiveness of proposed plans more reliable and more useful.  
The kinds of research that can produce the requisite information, locally or more generally, 
often in co-production, requires a mix of methods well beyond those listed in current evidence 
hierarchies. This suggestion resonates with other recent calls for more mixed-method research in 
education,1 but our reasons are different from the usual. The standard reasons for mixing methods 
in EBE are to aid implementation (Gorard et al., 2017) and to make general effectiveness claims 
more reliable (Connolly et al., 2017; Bryk, 2015). We, by contrast, encourage mixed methods because 
reliable and useful effectiveness predictions require a variety of different kinds of information 
relevant to determining how an intervention will perform in a specific setting that different kinds of 
research help to uncover. While local effectiveness predictions will never be certain, incorporating 
this information can improve them.    
Section I situates our project within the general intellectual setting and clarifies the 
contribution we wish to make. Section II provides an account of how the current research emphases 
in EBE contribute to the research-practice gap. Building on a framework2 that distinguishes 
different kinds of causal claims prevalent in evidence-based policy, we assess the role that RCTs can 
play for each, underlining that RCTs are poor evidence for what educators need to know: Will this 
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intervention work here in our school or classroom, for these students? Section III offers a catalogue 
of kinds of information that can help educators make local predictions that are reliable and useful. 
We urge developing and using a broader panoply of research methods than are generally endorsed in 
EBE to help uncover these kinds of information. Section IV compares other approaches that call 
for a better, broader mix of methods, like ‘implementation science’, ‘improvement science’, and 
‘practice-based evidence’ with our own.  
 
I.  Framing Our Project 
We acknowledge that debates about education research methodologies often stem from 
fundamental disagreements about the epistemology and ontology underpinning various approaches 
(e.g. Bridges, 2017; Bridges & Watts, 2008; Crotty, 1998; Howe, 2009; Phillips, 2007; Smeyers & 
Depaepe, 2007). In particular, many critics of EBE target the positivist approach they take it to 
represent. Our project does not contribute to these debates. Disagreements about the meaning of 
broad positions like ‘positivism’ abound; yet, differences between the relevant ontological and 
epistemological positions are difficult to pin down, as are their precise consequences for debates 
concerning EBE. Additionally, interlocutors on all sides disagree about whether the disputed 
positions bear a necessary relation to EBE.3 Although they continue to favor RCTs for investigating 
causal questions, many education researchers involved in EBE now take their background theories 
to be compatible with a wide range of methodologies (e.g. Connolly et al., 2017; Gorard et al., 2017). 
Instead of attempting to navigate this familiar, fraught landscape, we articulate specific problems 
underlying the research-practice gap without relying on controversial terminology or attempting to 
identify their ideological origins.  Still, readers will find that our arguments reflect and address some 
of the prevalent criticisms of EBE driving these debates—namely, the tendency to neglect the 
importance of context, of what teachers, students, and parents can contribute, and of professional 
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judgment (Biesta, 2007; Smeyers & Depaepe, 2007).   
However one classifies the dominant EBE model, it is part of a larger evidence-based 
movement across areas of social policy and is enshrined in U.S. federal education policy (Eisenhart 
& Town, 2003; Education Sciences Reform Act, 2002; No Child Left Behind Act, 2002; Every 
Student Succeeds Act, 2015). We start from their assumption that research can help improve 
students’ educational outcomes and experiences and hunt for ways to build and improve on the 
widespread efforts in this direction that are already in place. As we understand it, this assumption 
need not imply that social phenomena yield to the same study methods as natural phenomena, nor 
does it entail an instrumentalized view of education, a narrow conception of causality as 
deterministic, or denying that education involves agents who engage in socially-developed normative 
and cultural processes (Bridges & Watts, 2008; Biesta, 2007, 2010; Smeyers & Depaepe, 2007). To 
the contrary, we hold that effects issue from a plurality of context-local causal factors that contribute 
to them, including the actions, attitudes, norms, and habits of students, teachers, parents, school 
administration, and the wider neighborhoods in which these are embedded. Because we often 
cannot identify, untangle, or measure all of the factors that contribute to an outcome, our causal 
claims are never certain. Still, the warrant for them can be better or worse. 
We recognize that assessing effectiveness is only one part of a larger decision-making 
process that involves considering values, setting goals, and mapping local assets (Brighouse et al., 
2018). Educational policies and practices should be fair, compassionate, and effective; and it is 
difficult to predict if any of these, let alone all three, will be true for a policy we consider using here, 
as we are planning to implement it here, given the complicated set of interacting factors that are 
relevant here. We cannot tackle all three in this paper. We offer positive suggestions on the third – 
effectiveness – which is EBE’s central concern. Expectations can always go wrong, both ethically 
and epistemically, but care in deliberation can improve predictions on both sides. Our suggestions 
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here focus on the epistemic side, more specifically, on whether policies as planned for the local 
context will achieve their targeted aims, setting aside important ethical questions regarding choice of 
target and who is advantaged and disadvantaged by those choices.  
Because we situate our arguments within the existing EBE framework, they ought to be of 
interest to proponents seeking to improve its performance. At the same time, our diagnosis captures 
some of the familiar concerns commonly raised by anti-positivist critics. Like them, we reject the 
intervention-centered approach to EBE that focuses exclusively on ‘what works.’ Instead, we 
endorse a context-centered approach that starts from local problems in local settings with their own 
local values, aims, resources and capabilities to provide tools that help predict what will work there 
and what students, teachers, parents, and school staff can contribute to success.4 Framing our 
project this way allows readers with differing commitments to seriously consider and even accept 
our arguments, albeit they may do so for different reasons. 
 
II. Diagnosing the Problem 
II. 1. Getting clear on just what claims are being made 
Clarifying our concept of evidence helps distinguish distinct causal claims, which are often 
conflated without note to bad effect. Evidence is always evidence for (or against) something. The 
question is not ‘What makes a result good evidence?’  but rather ‘What makes a result good evidence 
for a particular claim?’ Using the concept of evidence imprecisely within EBE generates confusion that 
can undercut its success (Joyce & Cartwright, 2018; Kvernbekk, 2016; Spillane & Miele, 2007). A 
fact counts as evidence for a specified claim when it speaks to the truth of that claim. The argument 
theory of evidence provides a good way to capture this idea (Cartwright, 2010, 2013, 2017; Reiss, 2013; 
Scriven, 1994).  According to the argument theory, something is evidence for a claim when it serves 
as a premise in a sound argument for that claim. Sound arguments are comprised of trustworthy 
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premises that jointly imply the conclusion. To be trustworthy, each premise must be supported by 
good reasons. These can include, among other things, empirical facts established by research, 
observations, and credible theory.5   
The argument theory is a close cousin of the philosopher John Norton’s highly regarded 
material theory of induction. Norton (2003) points out that there are serious problems with all the 
standard attempts to articulate a theory of inductive inference that depend on form alone (as in the 
case of induction by simple enumeration, which we discuss later). What really does the work, he 
maintains, are material facts, encoded in substantive claims that connect the evidence with the 
hypothesis to be evidenced, showing just why the putative evidence is evidence for that hypothesis. 
For this theory too, a research result is evidence relative to a target hypothesis and to a set of 
additional claims describing material facts about the world, including often general truths.    
By contrast, some scholars use ‘research findings’ or ‘research,’ ‘knowledge,’ and ‘evidence’ 
interchangeably (e.g. Brown, 2014; Nutley & Walters & Davies, 2007). Their usage implies that when 
a study meets the espoused standards, its results count as ‘evidence’. This does not make sense. We 
must know what the claim is to decide whether—or under what further assumptions—some finding 
counts as evidence for it, and how. Labeling research results as ‘evidence’ obfuscates differences in 
the claims for which EBE needs evidence. 
 
 II.2. What kind of claim can RCTs support?   
Much of the literature advocating RCTs stresses the benefits of randomly assigning subjects 
to intervention and control groups in order to balance the other causal factors that might affect the 
outcome other than the intervention (e.g. Borman, 2009; Connolly et al., 2017; Gorard et al., 2017; 
Shavelson & Towne, 2002; Slavin, 2002). There are two problems with that. 
First, even if randomization did achieve balance, it only balances other factors at the time of 
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selection. Correlation with other causal factors can arise post-randomization. For example, getting 
new materials may encourage effort or confidence that aids performance among students in the 
intervention group. Where possible, experiments use blinding to reduce this problem. Ideally, 
research subjects, those delivering interventions, those measuring outcomes, and those doing the 
statistical analysis, are all unaware of who received which treatment. But, at best, blinding works 
poorly in educational experiments. Teachers, students, and administrators know who is receiving the 
intervention and who is in the comparison group. This knowledge alone can impact outcomes, as 
can the training and support for teachers delivering the intervention. 
Second, even supposing random assignment and successful blinding, we should not expect 
to get two groups that are the same with respect to all causal factors affecting the outcome other 
than the intervention. Getting balance like that in a study of, say, 100 units is like getting 50 heads in 
100 flips of a fair coin. Of course, generally, the larger the sample the closer the results on a single 
run can be expected to be to the true average. This is one of the reasons why the WWC encourages 
multiple, large RCTs. 
What we can expect if randomization, blinding, etc. are successful is this: 
RCT conclusion: The measured outcome – the difference between the observed mean 
in the treatment group and that in the control group – gives  
a. the average treatment effect6 
b. of the intervention provided in the treatment wing of the study compared to that 
provided in the control wing 
c. in expectation – across a hypothetical infinite sequence of runs of the experiment 
with a new randomization on each run 
d. for the population enrolled in the study. 
We need to be attentive to each of these: 
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 a. We only learn average results. Individuals in the study will generally have differed in their 
responses to the intervention and some may even have been harmed by it.  
b. Exactly what the control group received matters significantly to the size of the measured 
treatment effect – the effect will seem much bigger if the control group received an 
intervention that performs badly than if it received one that performs well.  
c. The estimate is, in technical language, unbiased. This has nothing to do with how close it is 
to the truth.7 
d. The conclusion can at best be a causal ascription.  
It is this last that we want to discuss in some detail. 
Studies – any study, RCT or otherwise – can only support results about the things studied. 
Conclusions about things not studied must depend on assumptions outside the range of the study. 
To play the role EBE assigns them, RCTs would have to be almost sufficient by themselves for 
effectiveness claims. But what a positive result from a very well-conducted RCT can directly support 
is just a claim of the form we have labeled ‘RCT conclusion’, which is about the study population. 
Indeed, the WWC explicitly states that its standards “focus on the causal validity within the study 
sample (internal validity)” (WWC, 2017a, p. 1 original emphasis). It should be obvious that a causal 
ascription in a study population cannot directly evidence a general effectiveness claim or an 
effectiveness prediction. The fact that an intervention worked somewhere cannot show that the 
intervention works or that it will work in some other target. 
 
II.3. Using results outside the study population 
Assume for the moment that the WWC succeeds in vetting RCTs for what is called ‘internal 
validity’, i.e. to ensure the RCTs really do support causal ascriptions in the study populations. 
Educators are concerned with whether the tested intervention can positively affect outcomes in their 
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setting. The central question for them is not what is usually called ‘external validity’: Will the same 
results hold here? Generally, the answer to that is ‘probably not’ given that the local factors that 
determine an effect size vary from setting to setting.  Rather, the central question is ‘What must be in 
place here for the intervention to deliver good enough results for us?’ And then, ‘Are the gains 
worth the expected costs?’ For guidance, the WWC combines study results that meet standards for 
internal validity to provide an effectiveness rating and an “improvement index” for each 
intervention. In both cases, it explicitly uses evidence supporting causal ascriptions and effect sizes 
within study groups as evidence for general effectiveness claims. For example, the WWC rates Read 
180, a multi-faceted literacy program, as having a positive effect on comprehension. The 
effectiveness rating rates the strength of evidence supporting the claim that Read 180 positively 
affected outcomes within a domain (e.g. comprehension) based on “the quality of research, the 
statistical significance of findings, the magnitude of findings, and the consistency of findings across 
studies” (WWC, 2016a). Interventions, including Read 180, merit the highest effectiveness rating 
when these factors provide “strong evidence that an intervention had a positive effect on outcomes” 
(WWC, n.d., our emphasis).  
The WWC calculates the effect size for each individual study by dividing the observed average 
treatment effect (the observed difference in mean outcomes between treatment and control) by the 
standard deviation of the outcome in the pooled treatment and control groups (WWC, 2017b). This 
means that all studies are recorded in ‘standard deviation units’, which, it is hoped, provides some 
sensible way to compare sizes for studies that use different scales for outcomes.  Then, it averages 
those (standardized) effect sizes to produce the effect size for the domain. For Read 180, the effect 
size, averaging across all six qualifying studies, is 0.15. This average provides the basis for the 
improvement index, which depicts “the size of the effect from using the intervention” in a way that 
is supposed to help educators “judge the practical importance of an intervention’s effect” (WWC, 
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2017b, p. 14). That is, it is supposed to represent the expected change in outcome for “an average 
comparison group student if the student had received the intervention” (p. 14, our emphasis).  Based 
on expected improvement for an average comparison group student, the improvement index for 
Read 180 is +6. Explaining its significance, the intervention report for Read 180 says that if given the 
intervention, the average student “can” be expected to improve their percentile rank by six percent 
(WWC, 2016b).  
The presentation of these findings implies that the stronger the evidence for causal 
ascriptions (represented by effectiveness ratings), the more credible is a general effectiveness claim 
or an effectiveness prediction.  Educators are thus led to believe that ‘strong’ evidence and large 
effect sizes indicate that the intervention will be highly effective, producing significant effects for 
them.8 For instance, because Read 180 earns the highest effectiveness rating, educators can 
reasonably expect their students to improve by six percent, on average. Apparently, using RCTs 
justifies the inference from internal validity in each study and consistent results across multiple 
studies (or faring well in a meta-analysis of study results) to this conclusion about what can be 
expected in general.   
 Clearly this is a mistake. It is only the consistency across studies that is any indicator that the 
result might hold generally or at my school for my students; and without more ado – much more 
ado – it is a weak indicator at that. Adding up causal ascriptions as the EBE literature seems to 
recommend amounts to induction by simple enumeration, which has long been condemned as a 
weak form of inference.9 When it does work, as it sometimes may in education, it is because the 
feature being generalized is projectable across the domain in question—not because the inference is 
based on multiple RCTs or combined findings from multiple RCTs.  Any education examples we cite 
will likely prove controversial, so instead to make the point clear we illustrate with the example of 
electric charge: A negative charge of 1.602177 × 10-19 Coulombs measured on a single electron is 
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projectable across all electrons because we have strong reasons from theory and a multitude of 
different kinds of empirical results that all electrons have the same charge. The same form of 
inference yields a false conclusion if it generalizes a feature that does not project onto the target 
population. Consider the oft-cited case of the color of swans. Multiple samples consisting of only 
swans in London’s Regents Park do not license the inference that all swans are white. Likewise, even 
if multiple RCTs show positive results, predictions need further premises showing that the causal 
relations being generalized to other students or schools projects onto them, as in the case of 
electrons. Without such premises, we risk drawing false conclusions, as with the swans.  
What kind of reasons can support projectability in educational contexts?  Imagine that a 
study has produced a good estimate of an average treatment effect in the study population and you 
want to argue that that estimate should hold for some target population. This would be warranted if 
you could argue that the students in the study sample are ‘representative’ of the target. One way to 
warrant that is to draw those students randomly from the target, where the target could either be a 
broad range of U.S. students or the students in a particular district or school. If the study group 
genuinely represents the target, then whatever probabilities are true of the study population (like the 
average effect of an intervention) are true of the target– that’s what it means to be representative. 
But of course, just as random assignment should not be expected to produce balance of other 
factors in any one run of an experiment, random sampling should not be expected to produce a 
representative study population on any one draw of a sample to study. The probabilities of the study 
sample and the parent only match in expectation—over a hypothetical infinite series of trials. For 
any one study, the average treatment effect may be accurate for the study group but far off from the 
parent.10  
Even without this worry, within education, transferring results from study to target 
population usually cannot be justified on these grounds because samples are seldom randomly 
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selected from the target population. Sometimes though a sample is drawn randomly from the 
students in a specific school or district, often with the plan to ‘scale up’ the intervention to the 
whole school or district if the study results are positive. But even if you draw your study students 
randomly, there are notorious difficulties in scaling up – the study population may not be 
representative of the whole population since people behave differently when a few receive the 
treatment than when all do.  
Nor is it easier to construct study populations that are representative of a broad range of 
U.S. students. Researchers work within constraints that impose criteria for selecting study 
populations. For instance, researchers might be confined to a school district. Within the district, they 
must conduct the study within schools that are willing and able to participate. Even if all schools in 
the district are obliged to participate if randomly selected, that district becomes the parent 
population. The district was not randomly selected, so the experiment cannot support generalizing 
average effect sizes beyond the district.  
A second problem is that random sampling from the target is not enough to ensure that the 
study results are representative of the target facts since much can happen to differentiate the two 
after sampling. Just as in an RCT, what happens to the sample after it is drawn may change the 
probabilities for relevant factors so that the sample is no longer representative of the parent. For 
instance, monitoring both groups may impact student performance independently of the 
intervention itself, which inflates effect sizes. Moreover, educational contexts are dynamic systems 
(Reynolds et al., 2014). Changes may occur that have no connection to implementing the 
intervention but still impact the reliability and generalizability of results.  
The alternative to random sampling from the target is to argue that the target and the study 
populations are the same, or similar enough, in the ways that affect the results to be projected (e.g. 
the size or the direction of the effect). This indeed can be – and often is – the case. Then the result 
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from the study is evidence for the conclusion drawn about the target. But as the argument theory 
demands, it is only evidence relative to the additional assumption that the two populations are alike 
in the relevant respects. For example, if students’ background knowledge or out-of-school resources 
impact the intervention’s performance in the study sample, then students in the target population 
must have relevantly similar background knowledge or resources. For credible evidence-based policy 
or practice, the assumption that populations are alike in the relevant ways itself needs to be backed 
up by good reasons (see Joyce, 2019), which can come from both theory and other empirical results.  
This is important in education because, as we have repeatedly remarked, it cannot be taken 
for granted that differences between educational contexts are negligible. Nuthall (2004) observes 
that “teaching one specific class of students is different from teaching any other class of students” 
because “engaging the students in relevant learning activities requires a unique understanding of 
each student’s interests and relationships with classroom peers” (p. 294). Thus, Nuthall concludes 
that “what works in one classroom or with one student will not necessarily work in other contexts” 
(p. 294). Nuthall’s insight that students within and across educational contexts have different needs 
to which educators must be responsive in practice seems especially important in contexts of 
inequality, where there are significant disparities in resources among students, schools, or districts. 
Research on school effectiveness and improvement conducted over the past few decades 
demonstrates the complex, dynamic nature of learning environments (e.g. Reynolds et al., 2014). 
Researchers in these fields argue that various factors within schools and broader education systems 
and outside of school impact students’ learning outcomes (Sarason, 1990; Lareau, 2011; McLeod, 
2004). For example, such research highlights the importance of school culture (Freiberg, 1999; 
Hargreaves, 1995; MacNeil et al., 2009; Sarason, 1996). As Halsall (1998) observes, “one of the most 
consistent messages from the school improvement literatures is that school culture has a powerful 
impact on any change effort” (p. 29).  Those who study its impact aim for “understandings of 
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sociocultural or organizational factors at the school level that facilitate or impede school 
improvement” (Schoen & Teddlie, 2008, p. 148). This literature indicates that even schools that 
share broad superficial characteristics like population density, range of socio-economic statuses, or 
urbanicity may differ in ways that bear on an intervention’s effectiveness.  Regardless of whether or 
not one accepts conclusions from school effectiveness or improvement research, the assumption 
that differences beyond superficial characteristics are irrelevant or inconsequential for assessing 
representation is a big assumption that requires serious justification.11 
 To judge when study and target settings are similar enough in the right ways takes theory – 
lots of it and of very different kinds. To learn just what it is about two different settings that allows 
them to support similar causal pathways from intervention to outcome requires a wealth of 
knowledge. This includes not only the theory of the process by which that intervention is supposed 
to bring about the intended result (sometimes called ‘the logic model’ or the ‘theory of change’ of 
the intervention) but also what contextual factors in the setting can support that process – for 
example, what are the  psychological and sociological mechanisms at work and what can we expect 
them to do in this setting,  what kinds of things in the economic and material structure can facilitate 
and what kind can hinder the process, and how can these be expected to interact in the target 
setting? None of this is to be learned from RCTs, even bigger and better ones. Still, it seems that 
conducting more large-scale RCTs remains the primary EBE strategy for improving evidence for 
effectiveness claims.  
There is good reason to think that focusing narrowly on RCT results without considering 
contextual factors has sometimes encouraged harmful consequences, especially for students from 
marginalized groups. Helen Ladd (2012) argues that EBE and associated reform strategies (e.g. test-
based accountability systems) are potentially harmful because they “pay little attention to meeting 
the social needs of disadvantaged children” (p. 204). Attempts to improve school quality ignore the 
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contextual factors associated with poverty “that directly impede student learning” (p. 219; see also 
Duncan & Murnane, 2011, 2014). One particular harm concerns the unequal distribution of highly 
credentialed teachers. The idea that interventions work, when implemented with fidelity, de-
emphasizes the importance of quality teachers by suggesting that disparities in teachers’ abilities 
across schools are not a problem as long as those in schools serving disadvantaged students are 
good enough to implement effective interventions faithfully.  
Another harm stems from the fact that “instructionally focused interventions pay insufficient 
attention” to students’ “socioemotional-learning needs” (Rowan, 2011, p. 534). Brian Rowan points 
out that benefitting from even high-quality instruction usually requires certain socioemotional skills, 
which correspond to social advantage (Becker and Luthar, 2002; McLeod & Kaiser, 2004; Rowan, 
2011). Failure to recognize this can conceal the need to provide students with socioemotional 
learning opportunities and support. At the same time, overestimating the impact of students’ 
behavior or social skills on learning (which seems sometimes to stem from implicit biases) can lead 
to overemphasizing discipline (e.g. some high-commitment ‘No Excuses’ charter schools) to the 
detriment of socially disadvantaged students (see Brighouse & Schouten, 2011; Curto et al., 2011; 
Tough, 2013).  Further, thinking only about the effectiveness of interventions risks neglecting the 
quality of students’ experiences, which can bear on outcomes but are also important in their own 
right. While here we focus on the general question of how to bridge the research-practice gap, these 
unintended side-effects underscore the importance of shifting toward a context-centered approach 
to EBE.  
 
III. Bridging the Gap 
For EBE to help improve educational outcomes, it must generate evidence that supports 
effectiveness predictions: ‘This intervention will work here, as we plan to use it.’ One indirect route 
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to this is via establishing a general effectiveness claim: ‘If it almost always works, within a broad range 
of contexts and ways of implementing it, it will probably work here.’ But, establishing these is a 
demanding task. Supporting such claims requires showing that an intervention has a stable causal 
capacity. For example, aspirin has a relatively stable capacity to relieve headaches: It reliably does so 
across wide-ranging circumstances and populations. It is unclear whether educational interventions 
can have stable capacities and, if at least some of them do, how we could arrive at them given the 
nature of educational contexts. As Berliner (2002) remarks, educational researchers conduct their 
investigations “under conditions that physical scientists find intolerable” (p. 19).  However, 
establishing general effectiveness is not necessary for making reliable predictions of the sort 
educators need.  
 We suggest less emphasis on general effectiveness claims, which are hard to come by, in 
favor of research that produces evidence educators can use to make causal predictions locally. After 
all, for educators, a successful intervention is one that contributes to a positive effect for them 
regardless of whether it can do so elsewhere. Incorporating a prediction phase into the EBE model 
means educators and policymakers must do more than choose and implement interventions that are 
deemed to work. To plan policy and predict effectiveness, they must construct arguments with 
multiple premises supported by various types of information, which will necessarily involve theory 
as well as empirical results of various kinds. Because their arguments require complex local 
knowledge and judgment, educators themselves can have much of the information needed to make 
predictions for their settings. But most premises need to be warranted by other types of evidence, 
some of which researchers can supply. Namely, researchers can provide information to help 
educators recognize just what facts may be relevant for predictions regarding particular 
interventions. And many of these facts will be theoretical in nature. It is no good just piling up study 
results. If we want research to be useful to practice there is no way to avoid the heavy work of 
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detailing the theory of change of the intervention, of developing new concepts like metacognition, 
meta-affective awareness, stereotype threat, Bloom’s Taxonomy (and its revision), and of generating 
and vetting general claims and mechanisms well beyond those of the form ‘It works’.  
We can take a lead here from recent work on evidence and child protection. Munro et al. 
(2016) outline three kinds of information that contribute to reliable local effectiveness predictions 
about an intervention: 
1. Knowledge that the local social, economic, cultural, and physical structure can afford the 
necessary causal pathways for the intervention to lead to the outcome 
2. Knowledge of what the support factors are for that intervention to work in the local setting 
and of whether these are available or can be made available 
3. Knowledge of what derailers might interfere along the way to diminish or entirely halt 
progress toward the outcome. 
Structure. Can the intervention work here or do local conditions simply not afford the steps 
that it takes, start-to-finish, (which are hopefully outlined in the theory of change of the 
intervention) to produce the outcome? For instance, no amount of tinkering with the reward 
structures for parents within resource constraints will get more children vaccinated in places where 
there are no vaccination clinics within reach and there is a strong cultural resistance to vaccination. 
Similarly, creating systems to incentivize or hold teachers accountable for students’ performance is 
unlikely to improve outcomes at schools where teachers are already doing their best and low-
performance is primarily attributable to out-of-school factors. Likewise, active-learning strategies like 
in-class peer review may only contribute to better essays in classes where students have similar 
writing skills and have the time to receive feedback from multiple classmates, revise their essays to 
accommodate feedback, and receive supplementary guidance from the teacher.  
A successful RCT result can play a role in helping to warrant a prediction that the 
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intervention tested will work here since a positive study result indicates that the intervention can 
produce the effect at least under some set(s) of circumstances. There is still much to add, however, 
since the whole point is that the same intervention can perform differently in settings with different 
underlying social structures. So, far more research effort needs to be devoted to understanding 
which kinds of social/economic/cultural/material structures can afford success with an intervention 
and which cannot. (For example, see our discussion of Posey-Maddox’s study below.) This way, 
decision-makers will have better resources for choosing the intervention that is best for them or for 
assessing and adjusting structures to accommodate new practices. Additionally, this kind of 
information can help educators who may want to adapt an intervention to allow for better 
integration with other practices or simply to capitalize on the potential it has within their setting.  
Support factors are all those usually less obvious features that need to operate with the 
intervention for it to achieve its intended effects in the local setting. 12 Causes, including 
interventions, rarely work alone. They require support from various factors that are easy to overlook 
if we focus narrowly on isolating and measuring the effects of interventions. For example, available 
technology and computer literacy may be support factors for educational software. Values and 
norms within the school and community also count as support factors. Derailers are those disruptive 
factors that can undermine the intervention. Geography might serve as a derailer for interventions 
that assign substantial amounts of homework or require students to work with classmates outside of 
school. If many students commute from rural areas, they might not have time to do the homework 
and may not have access to their classmates. Even if all support factors are present, a significant and 
ineliminable detracting factor may count against choosing an intervention—especially if the potential 
derailer is a valuable school asset we would not wish to eliminate. A thriving collaborative 
environment that facilitates interaction and group work might be a ‘derailer’ relative to an 
intervention that mostly requires working independently, for instance.  
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To make plans and evaluate predictions about how effective they will be, decision-makers 
need to decide whether their setting is at all right for the intervention and then gauge whether the 
requisite support factors are in place in their setting or can be put into place with reasonable cost 
and effort, as well as what the chances are of derailers occurring down the line to disrupt the 
process. What then is needed from the research community is more theorization and a far broader 
body of empirical work that can help with these issues, even if the information supplied is not as 
certain as the RCT results that currently take center stage.  
Researchers can also help by identifying the underlying causes that contributed to the 
problem in the study populations so that educators can consider whether their problem has the same 
causes as it did in the study population where the intervention worked to provide a solution. 
Sometimes an intervention may be an effective solution to a problem with different underlying 
causes, and sometimes the causes may not be relevant. But we cannot rely on that to hold generally.  
Consider, for example, practices that involve ability-grouping—assigning students to 
classrooms or groups according to their perceived level of abilities. Creating more homogenous 
groups is supposed to solve the problems teachers face when their classes contain students with 
varying abilities and needs. Students at all levels are thought to benefit from instruction that caters to 
their abilities and from learning alongside peers who are similar in that respect (Colangelo et al., 
2004; Gentry, 2014; Steenbergen-Hu et al., 2016). Such practices have many advocates who laud 
their significant positive effects on student achievement across ability groupings, while many critics 
argue that they are harmful to students who are socially disadvantaged (Carbonaro, 2005; Carbonaro 
& Gamoran, 2002; Ladd, 2012; Oakes, 2005).  
Plausibly, the different outcomes stem in part from that fact that wide variation in 
performance among students in the same grade is a problem with different underlying causes. In 
places where variance grows out of natural differences among students, ability-grouping may affect 
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students’ experiences and outcomes differently than in schools where social disadvantage 
significantly contributes to the variation. In the latter case, sorting mechanisms—no matter how 
objective they are intended to be—will likely be unreliable because social disadvantage affects both 
talent development and performance. Also, implicit biases may unfairly affect the process by 
influencing expectations and interpretations of performance. For these reasons, assessments of 
ability may be inaccurate and focusing on ability may actually undermine educational goals. Targeting 
underlying causes may not always be feasible or desirable but understanding them can inform 
predictions about which solution will be most effective for aiding achievement or pursuing other 
aims. 
Many of these issues can be tackled by educational theory and research that is currently 
marginalized within the dominant EBE framework. Qualitative methods like case studies and 
ethnographies can illuminate social structures and analyze their interactions with processes or 
programs. They can study the causes of local problems and identify factors that may support or 
detract from improvement efforts.  
For example, in her ethnographic case study of Morningside Elementary in Northern 
California, Posey-Maddox (2014) examines the role of parental involvement in an urban school. As a 
participant observer, she intensively collected data over the course of one school year using a range 
of qualitative methods including interviews with parents, teachers, and community members, 
observation, anonymous surveys, and analysis of relevant documents. Posey-Maddox collected 
further data for one year after her time at Morningside Elementary, returning for follow-up 
interviews and observation. Two years later, she returned for additional follow-up to assess the 
longer-term effects of the parental involvement programs at Morningside (Posey-Maddox, 2014, 
Appendix B).  
Posey-Maddox uses a variety of theoretical tools and frameworks to analyze the data she 
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collected during her time at Morningside. She describes unintended consequences stemming from 
the school’s reliance on parental volunteers to fill resource gaps and identifies factors that likely 
contributed to those outcomes, like shifting student demographics and disparities in parents’ social 
capital. Additionally, she distinguishes between various types of parental contributions and explores 
ways in which each of them shaped dynamics within the school. Her analysis of the context, 
processes, and effects associated with parental involvement draws on social theory, including 
Bourdieu’s theories of social power structures (e.g. Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990; Bourdieu & Nice, 
1977).   
In addition to providing conceptual tools to aid interpretation, using theory allows 
researchers like Posey-Maddox to develop plausible, albeit defeasible, explanations and explore 
possible implications beyond the case at hand. Her analysis of Morningside Elementary reveals 
factors that could affect interventions and identifies the circumstances in which they might do so. It 
thus alerts educators to potential costs and benefits of various options for designing programs, like 
opportunities for parental involvement. More broadly, this kind of study demonstrates how 
particular norms, beliefs, values, and dynamics that may be present elsewhere bear on general 
processes within schools.  
Although these findings do not speak directly to what will happen in other cases and thus do 
not supply conclusions, they identify premises that are relevant to predictions about similar programs in 
similar contexts. Unlike RCTs, ethnographies and case studies attempt to understand which factors 
made a difference and how they did so. This information can help others determine whether their 
settings are similar in ways that affected outcomes in the study setting. Relatedly, they can offer 
insight into how costs and benefits were distributed across students and the factors that influenced 
that distribution.   
For instance, Posey-Maddox attributes the negative consequences she observed to race- and 
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class-based inequalities within the larger community that affected the nature and outputs of parental 
involvement. These consequences may not occur at a school serving a racially and 
socioeconomically homogenous population, even if parents become involved in the same ways. 
What her ethnography illustrates is the potential for race and socioeconomic status to detract from 
efforts to fill resource gaps by involving parents in certain environments. More generally, it suggests 
that social structures outside of the school are relevant to the success of such programs and to their 
distribution of benefits and burdens. Ignoring these factors can undermine improvement efforts. 
Equally, assuming that they are always relevant without considering when and how they matter 
might lead decision-makers to dismiss interventions that could work for them. Credible theory 
examining relationships between education and external social structures, especially those involving 
social power, could help draw out the significance of these findings for other cases (e.g. Horvat & 
Lareau, 2003; Lareau, 2011).  
To be sure, educational theory and non-experimental research have value beyond the role 
they could play in effectiveness predictions. Indeed, academic communities engage in this work and 
numerous academic journals are dedicated to publishing it.  However, these enterprises usually run 
parallel to educational research for EBE.  Their potential to contribute to the EBE model as we are 
suggesting remains underappreciated. As a result, information from these literatures is not prepared 
or mobilized for use by educational decision-makers. Intermediaries like the WWC emerged in part 
because proponents of EBE recognize that academic journals generally do not highlight practical 
implications and educational decision-makers rarely consult them (Gorard et al., 2017; Nuthall, 2004; 
Phillips, 2007).  
Existing work from these disciplines may be useful for identifying necessary premises and 
finding evidence for effectiveness predictions. Applying these methods within EBE can expand its 
relevance.  Researchers could investigate questions concerning context, social structure, support 
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factors, and derailers alongside RCTs. Similarly, they could study interventions that have been tested 
by RCTs as they are implemented in new settings or analyze failed attempts to use them. Learning 
about successful adaptations and failures can inform predictions and local planning.  
Some researchers have undertaken such projects, but their efforts are largely directed at 
aiding implementation rather than prediction. Consider the study of Success for All (SFA) conducted 
by Datnow and Castellano (2000). After experimental studies found positive effects on students’ 
literacy across multiple sites, Datnow and Castellano investigate “how teachers respond to SFA and 
how their beliefs, experiences, and programmatic adaptations influence implementation” (p. 777). 
Their findings yield multiple suggestions that can help decision-makers predict what will happen if 
they implement SFA in their own sites. For instance, nearly all teachers adapted the program in 
some way as a response to local factors or perceived deficiencies of SFA. Considering the most 
common adaptations, teachers’ reasons for implementing them, and how they affected outcomes 
could help decision-makers assess, among other things, the need for and likelihood of adaptations in 
their own setting and evaluate their estimated impact. In these ways, their findings provide guidance 
for applying local knowledge and professional judgment within predictions. While some of their 
other findings are more useful for implementation than for prediction, designing the project with 
predictions in mind could lead to results that more directly support them.  
When considering interventions tested by RCTs, it is useful for educators to evaluate how 
well the study population and setting represent their own along relevant dimensions. Information 
about which demographics are relevant to that particular intervention and how they affect it can be 
of great help to them here. Currently, the WWC provides the same demographic information for all 
interventions (e.g. minority status, qualification for National School Lunch Program) without 
specifying which are likely to affect effectiveness. 
 Considering only those interventions with populations and contexts that are representative 
 27 
in terms of all observed characteristics will likely leave research-users with few choices.  Moreover, 
the categories the WWC uses are too broad to be useful in many cases. For example, there are surely 
many differences among students who qualify for the reduced-cost school lunch program and 
among those with minority status. How does low socioeconomic or minority status bear on the 
intervention in question? Can it be expected to have a similar impact on other interventions? We 
cannot expect all low socioeconomic communities or households to have the same assets, support 
factors, and derailers. Socioeconomic status may be a better indicator of family dynamics and 
parental behavior in some places compared to others and those behaviors and dynamics may vary 
qualitatively, for instance (Furstenberg, 2011). Additionally, some interventions depend on these 
factors more than others. Without some understanding of why and how the results emerged, 
decision-makers may hastily dismiss interventions that have failed in broadly similar settings without 
asking whether they could have been effective for them, perhaps with some adaptation and 
improvement. For these reasons, research that helps educators assess representativeness along the 
relevant dimensions could be especially useful.  
Educational decision-makers must also consider costs and benefits. Effectiveness 
predictions play an important role in a larger, all-things-considered decision-making process (see 
Brighouse et al., 2018). Educators need to know what effects they can expect so they can decide 
whether those benefits outweigh expected costs. The average treatment effect documents the 
difference in effects between intervention and comparison groups. Recall point (b) in the RCT 
conclusion formula. For educators, estimating the average effect they can expect requires comparing 
their current curriculum to what was used in the study’s comparison group. If they are using a much 
better literacy program than the comparison group, for example, they should prima facie expect a 
smaller average effect or even a negative one. Likewise, if their program is much worse, the effect 
might be greater. Again, recall point (a) in the RCT conclusion.  
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Often, cost-benefit calculations at the local level concern individual students, not averages. 
Knowing how an intervention affected particular individuals or students with certain characteristics 
can usefully inform predictions about who is likely to benefit and who may bear costs. This 
information is especially important given persistent achievement gaps between racial and 
socioeconomic groups. Knowing average effects is insufficient for choosing interventions that will 
help (or at least not harm) underserved students.  
Return to the case of ability-grouping. Meta-analyses of multiple RCTs and second-order 
meta-analyses consistently show positive effects on average (Steenbergen-Hu et al., 2016), leading 
some to recommend ability-grouping (e.g. Gentry, 2014). However, these averages do not document 
effects on students from particular groups. A particularly strong endorsement claims that, because 
“talent cuts across all demographics: ethnicity, gender, geography, and economic background,” 
ability-grouping is particularly beneficial to talented students from disadvantaged groups (Colangelo 
et al., 2004, p. 7). But this is just an assumption—the data is only disaggregated by ability groups, not 
by social groups. Even if it were, averages for subgroups do not account for intersectionality, 
accuracy of sorting, different applications, or quality of experience. On average, students of color 
may benefit because the most advantaged among them improve dramatically while those with the 
lowest socioeconomic status are negatively impacted, for example.   
Research that can shed light on these issues should be considered, even if its findings are less 
certain than RCT results. For instance, recall Posey-Maddox’s observation that students from 
middle-class families gained greater benefits from parental involvement programs than more 
disadvantaged students and examines factors that likely contributed to the uneven distribution of 
benefits (2014, p.100-105). Although qualitative studies do not document effect sizes or precisely 
quantify benefits, they provide some relevant evidence for premises that concern costs and benefits. 
Addressing the harms stemming from educational inequalities continues to be a central goal for 
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education policy and practice in the U.S. Given its urgency, there is pressing need for relevant 
information to inform predictions concerning individual students.  
While we have offered some suggestions, we are calling on the research community to 
seriously investigate just what can be done at a research level to help local decision-makers identify 
and find the facts they need to predict if an intervention is likely to work in their setting, what it 
would take to get it to do so, and whom it might help and whom it might harm. In this enterprise, 
the best should not be the enemy of the good. It is no use insisting that the information supplied be 
information that one can be fairly certain is correct – as in policing and reporting causal ascriptions 
supported by well-done RCTs—when it is not the information educators need. A far more 
ambitious, and riskier, program of research, theorizing, and reporting needs to be undertaken if 
‘evidence’ is really going to help improve educational outcomes. 
 
IV. Complementary Calls for Expanding the Research Agenda in EBE 
Our proposal resembles some others that suggest diversifying research approaches and 
incorporating educators’ local knowledge, judgment, and expertise into the decision-making process 
(e.g. McIntyre, 2005; Bridges & Smeyers & Smith, 2009; Smeyers & Depaepe, 2007; Bryk, 2015; 
Hammersley, 2015; Brown et al., 2017). But none focus on the source of the research-practice gap 
that we identify: unwarranted effectiveness claims. Some think general effectiveness claims can be 
established more quickly and reliably by supplementing evidence from research with evidence from 
practice. Others advise using these resources to connect the two ‘communities’ or ‘worlds’ of 
research and practice by translating general effectiveness claims into practical suggestions. Still 
others focus on improving implementation protocols. Additionally, some recent policy initiatives 
encourage place-based or practice-based interventions.13 The idea is to identify promising 
interventions created within educational contexts as responses to problems and to figure out how to 
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scale them up. While some of them propose recasting the relationship between research and practice 
communities as bidirectional (e.g. Farley-Ripple et al., 2018), these new suggestions for connecting 
research and practice tend to preserve the division of labor that assigns establishing causal claims to 
researchers and implementation to educators. From our perspective, these suggestions get 
something right that will help address the gap that concerns us, though not intentionally for that 
reason, and are thus potentially useful within the adjusted, context-centered EBE approach we 
endorse.  
 
IV.1 Research-Practice Partnerships 
Research-Practice Partnerships (RPPs) are gaining momentum as a strategy for bridging the 
research-practice gap (Coburn & Penuel, 2016).14 RPPs are collaborations between educators and 
educational researchers. They aim for research with greater relevance to practice and to improve the 
use of research in decision-making and practice. The driving idea is that research outcomes will be 
more applicable to practice if educators influence the research agenda. Educators share pressing 
problems with researchers who then study interventions targeting those issues. Researchers can 
directly help educators interpret the findings and decide how to use them in practice.  
For example, Stanford University’s School of Education has partnered with the San 
Francisco Unified School District to “help Stanford researchers produce more useful research and 
to help San Francisco administrators use research evidence to inform their decisions” (Wentworth et 
al., 2017, p. 244). One of their projects studied the outcomes of an ethnic studies course the district 
was piloting in some of their schools. Researchers used a regression discontinuity design to study the 
effects of the program on five school-year cohorts from three schools in the district. Ninth graders 
whose GPA was below 2.0 in the previous year were automatically enrolled in the course while 
students with GPA’s at or above 2.0 were not. Those enrolled could opt out and others could opt in. 
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The study compares students just below the 2.0 threshold to students just above it because students 
in these two groups are taken to be similar (Dee & Penner, 2016). They found that the course 
positively affected GPAs and attendance for students assigned to the course, who were identified as 
at-risk of dropping out (Dee & Penner, 2016; Wentworth, 2016). District leaders used these findings 
to decide whether to implement the course throughout the district.  
In this case, school administrators needed data to answer a specific question and researchers 
designed a study to obtain it. Researchers then helped administrators interpret the data, highlighting 
what it means for the decision they needed to make. While the research questions differ, this case 
exemplifies the typical relationship between practitioners and researchers involved in RPPs. The 
partnership is supposed to be mutually beneficial in that researchers obtain results with broader 
significance that they can publish in academic journals while practitioners get data that is directly 
relevant to them. 
Organized this way, RPPs support the standard division of labor between educators and 
researchers. Practice guides research in the sense that it influences the research question. Beyond 
that, interaction primarily involves researchers helping to interpret results, drawing out their 
implications for practice. Researchers still produce information to serve as evidence in decisions 
about practice while educators focus on implementation.  
RPPs pinpoint relevance of evidence as a key step in bridging the gap. We too underline the 
need for research to produce relevant evidence. However, RPPs generally aim for results relevant to 
particular learning outcomes whereas we urge evidence relevant to effectiveness predictions. Researching 
interventions that target local problems does not reduce the need for predicting effectiveness. In 
addition to aligning research projects with school districts’ goals, RPPs seek generalizable results, 
which they suggest can be achieved using experimental or quasi-experimental methods (sometimes 
with the help of statistics), contrary to what we have argued. The research projects Stanford 
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conducts in partnership with the San Francisco Unified School District are supposed to meet “high 
standards of validity and generalizability” so they are relevant to other districts aiming for similar 
learning outcomes (Wentworth, 2016, p. 68). To serve our purposes, RPPs would need to address a 
wider array of questions. As it is, they are motivated by the idea that “education research does not 
influence policy because it takes too long to produce, is too expensive, is not applicable to a specific 
context of interest, and is not disseminated in a clear and direct manner” (López Turley & Stevens, 
2016, p. 6S). 
From our point of view, university-partnered single-school RPPs like those pioneered by 
four University of California campuses take a more promising approach.15 Researchers and 
educators collaborate at all levels of school design and practice. Quartz, et al. (2017) describe their 
distinctive RPPs as “multidimensional and multilevel problem-solving ecologies” that are committed 
to “democratic participation” wherein “researchers and practitioners…bring their knowledge to the 
table and together ‘build the plane while flying’’’ (p. 144-145). The university-partnered single-school 
design departs from standard RPPs by integrating researchers and practitioners. Instead of working 
with educators to identify problem areas and test potential solutions, help them implement best 
practices, or replicate an existing, evidence-based solution, researchers are familiar with available 
causal pathways and, in collaboration with educators, design solutions that are likely to be effective 
within that particular context.  
For example, researchers in the Education Department at UC Berkeley partnered with 
Aspire Public Schools to prepare students for college. After working together for more than ten 
years, Aspire and UC Berkeley designed and co-founded CAL Prep, a public charter school based on 
local knowledge and “community-engaged scholarship.”16Their strategies were “developed through 
careful and systematic study of the conditions that allowed all students to meet high academic 
standards” (Quartz et al., 2017, p. 144-145). While, according to Quartz, et al. (2017), these RPPs 
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strive to create knowledge that generalizes beyond their settings, their approach equips them to 
share information about support factors, underlying causes of the problems they respond to, and 
individual students which, we have argued, are important for local predictions and planning.  
 
IV.2 Implementation Science 
Implementation science has emerged as another response to the research-practice gap. The 
National Implementation Research Network (NIRN) describes it as “the science related to 
implementing [evidence-based] programs, with high fidelity, in real-world settings” (AI HUB, Module 
1, n.d.) According to prominent implementation scientists Blasé (2011, 2013) and Fixsen (2009, 
2010, 2013), the way to bridge the gap between research and practice is to create the infrastructure 
for successful implementations within education sites. The University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill 
hosts the State Implementation and Scaling-up of Evidence-based Practices Center (SISEP), funded 
by the U.S. Department of Education. SISEP is a project within the National Implementation 
Research Network that creates resources for educators. They present implementation as an active, 
recursive process of “making it happen” instead of simply letting or helping an intervention succeed 
(Fixsen et al., 2009, p. 532; NIRN, 2016). Implementation scientists have developed an 
infrastructure that affords the capacity to implement effective interventions or innovations. It is 
made up of five integrated frameworks called Active Implementation Frameworks (AIFs).,  
Roughly, AIFs encourage and support high-fidelity implementations of evidence-based 
interventions within particular local contexts (Blasé et al., 2015; Bryk, 2015; Carroll et al., 2007; 
Fixsen et al., 2009; Fixsen et al., 2017; Fixsen & Ogden, 2014). While implementation capacities are 
considered to be standard across educational settings, AIFs encourage users to take characteristics of 
their own sites into account at various stages. Implementation begins by exploring options using a 
Hexagon tool to assess the extent to which available interventions and their expected effects fit with 
 34 
local needs, priorities, and existing programs (Metz & Louison, 2018).  
Once they decide to implement an intervention, teams install it by making practical 
arrangements and “developing the knowledge, skills and abilities of teachers and administrators” 
through training and coaching (AI HUB, Module 1, n.d.). From there, they build toward full 
implementation. In part, this involves establishing and sustaining implementation drivers—core 
components that ensure competence among those engaging in implementation efforts, develop 
supports for the program, and assign leadership roles. These drivers capture “common features that 
exist among many successfully implemented programs and practices” (AI HUB, Module 1, n.d.). 
The additional frameworks concern implementation teams, which monitor implementation 
infrastructure and employ AIFs, and improvement cycles, which offer tools for identifying and 
solving problems that occur during implementation (Blasé et al., 2015). 
This brief description oversimplifies AIF, but it sketches the contours well enough to 
contrast it with our proposal. Although it recognizes that local context can significantly impact 
implementation and eschews the idea that educators can simply apply research findings in practice, 
implementation science still adopts some of the problematic assumptions driving the dominant EBE 
model. In particular, it appears to assume that, in Seckinelgin’s words, “the integrity of the research 
presented stands alone on its scientific grounds… context becomes only an issue once we move to 
consider policy implementation, focusing on particular target/risk groups and the way we can deliver 
to them what we know works” (2017, p. 132). Implementation science focuses on scaling up 
evidence-based programs by helping schools cultivate the capacities for successful implementation 
because it accepts that interventions that produce a positive outcome in a handful of good RCTs can 
generally be expected to do so elsewhere if implemented with fidelity, barring positive reasons to the 
contrary. As Fixsen (2013) puts it, the aim is to “take these good ideas that work in some places and 
get them to work in all places.” Like other proposals to bridge the research-practice gap, it neglects 
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the question of whether an intervention can work in a specific target when implemented, whether 
with or without fidelity.  
Using AIFs cannot ensure that an intervention can or will be effective in a particular setting. 
The Hexagon tool for selecting interventions directs attention to local context but focuses on 
whether it allows high-fidelity implementation. It does not ask whether the intervention can work in 
that setting as it did in study settings. In other words, it leaves the prediction phase out of the 
selection process. This is a problem because assessing the feasibility of implementation without 
predicting effectiveness could lead educators to choose an intervention that can be implemented in 
their setting but cannot work in their setting. To see this, consider a simple example: a computer 
program that produced positive effects for study populations when students used it in two-hour 
increments three times per week. Implementing the program in their own site requires educators to 
schedule two-hour time slots for students to use the program three times per week. Successful 
implementation, however, does not guarantee that it will produce positive effects there. There are 
many reasons that it might not: By making time for it they could inadvertently eliminate support 
factors for the program or activities that contribute to morale; their students might stop 
concentrating on it after just half an hour for any number of reasons; or, six hours per week may be 
too much or too little time given their students’ skill sets.  There is an important difference between 
the question of whether the local context affords a causal pathway through which the intervention 
can make a positive contribution and the question of whether it will allow educators to implement 
the intervention with fidelity.    
Evaluating evidence is part of the Hexagon process, but it invites users to take general 
effectiveness for granted if the research meets certain criteria. It prompts users to evaluate the 
strength of evidence according to the number of studies that have been conducted using 
experimental methods with diverse populations, much like the WWC (Metz & Louison, 2018). It 
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does encourage users to compare their setting and population to the study and replication sites. 
These are factors relevant to predictions. But, recall that an RCT does not identify what population 
or contextual characteristics are important. Unless one replicates the whole set of post-allocation 
differences with exact fidelity, there is no evidence that the difference will work even granting 
projectability.17  
 We want to reiterate that perfect fidelity is not possible. Educational settings are so complex 
that reporting how interventions were implemented in a study likely leaves out details that could be 
relevant. More importantly, aiming for fidelity is very often not the best way to implement an 
intervention. Given significant differences across students and contexts, even if the target closely 
resembles the study along visible dimensions, producing positive effects in new settings will very 
likely require adjustments.  Appreciating this, Nuthall (2004) observes that “the contextual details 
that [have] been eliminated from these studies in order to make the results generalizable are what 
teachers needed to know in order to … apply the results” (p. 286).  
The Hexagon tool attempts to address these issues by advocating interventions with clearly 
defined components and a logic model or theory of change that can help educators make only ‘safe’ 
adjustments and assess progress. Although descriptions of the intervention components and 
implementation are likely to be incomplete, we agree that understanding key components and how 
they are supposed to produce outcomes would be helpful during implementation. However, prior to 
that they should inform predictions, which ask if an intervention can work in the target setting as it 
would be implemented there.   
Notice that, just as they do not identify relevant population and contextual characteristics, 
RCTs do not show which components of interventions are essential to the causal process nor do 
they provide theories of change. Those who designed the interventions may offer theories, but they 
are seldom tested, and, again, RCTs cannot be used to verify them. Positive RCT results do not 
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show that a theory of change is accurate. Calling for this kind of information, then, signals the need 
for evidence from different sources to support different claims. Even if it were available, though, 
neither the Hexagon tool nor the other AIFs offer guidance for evaluating the kind of research and 
theory that could evidence these claims or speak to alternative pathways through which the 
intervention could make a positive contribution. Importantly, to be relevant to predictions, theories 
of change must account for support factors and derailers specific to the local target. While they 
provide some helpful information, even well-supported theories of change conceptualized by 
researchers or developers cannot identify these in advance. We suggest that far more effort be 
dedicated to providing the resources educators need to choose interventions that are likely to work 
for them and to make an implementation plan that is best for their setting.   
 
IV. 3 Improvement Science, Networked Improvement Communities, and Practice-based Evidence 
 Another solution encourages complements to RCTs under the rubric of improvement science. 
Improvement science investigates variation in educational outcomes and devises strategies for 
addressing the sources of variation so interventions can work more effectively across contexts. 
Instead of building capacities for implementing programs with fidelity, as implementation science 
does, improvement science builds “capacity within the organization to understand the factors that 
shape improvement” and “to notice and learn from variation” (Lewis, 2015, p. 59). Whereas 
implementation science attempts to avoid modifications that undermine the intervention by clearly 
specifying its components and monitoring fidelity at the implementation site, improvement science 
does not recommend fidelity. Instead, it attempts to avoid modifying interventions in a way that 
undermines them by monitoring indicators predicted by theories of change and contextual factors 
that are taken to shape improvement (Lewis, 2015). 
For example, Bryk (2011, 2015) proposes a collaborative effort among educators to 
 38 
investigate why effects from the same intervention vary across educational settings. This would 
involve looking for the kinds of information we outlined in section III. Understanding what causes 
variation in effectiveness, he argues, allows educators to identify contextual factors that affect 
results. Sharing their findings widely through networked improvement communities (NIC) provides 
“practice-based evidence” that educators can use for better implementation (Campbell et al., 2017).  
In a similar vein, Brown, with Schildkamp and Hubers (2017), suggests integrating scientific 
research with locally-collected quantitative and qualitative data that educators use to identify goals 
and inform action for reaching them. Gutiérrez and Penuel (2014) argue that establishing that an 
intervention ‘works’ requires qualitative research from educators who can provide information about 
how they used interventions within their settings. These proposals highlight the need for practical 
knowledge and action-research to supplement experimental research.  
Like us, Bryk (2015) identifies an important, but neglected, distinction within EBE. He 
agrees that research shows only that an intervention can work but claims that what educators really 
need is “knowledge of how to actually make it work reliably over diverse contexts and populations” 
(p. 469, our emphasis). Contrast this with our claim that what educators need to know is that the 
intervention will work here, in their setting. Bryk assumes that evidence-based interventions can work 
across educational settings if the intervention or setting is properly adjusted. He advocates figuring 
out how to replicate results in different settings to produce “quality student outcomes reliably at 
scale” (2015, p. 475). While they concern more specific target settings, these suggestions still aim for 
general effectiveness claims that can justify predictions. We definitely agree that if there are 
reasonably reliable general claims about the kinds of populations and settings an intervention works 
for and how it can be used effectively in these, this is important information to secure. But we fear 
that there will often be too few of these kinds of reliable claims to provide much help. Looking for 
this sort of information is important, but it cannot replace the need for helping educators to find the 
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necessary information and to piece it together to make local effectiveness predictions as we are 
suggesting.  
If we treat the information from practice as evidencing general effectiveness claims, then 
these proposals are unlikely to improve significantly on the existing model. Using the argument 
theory, we can more easily see what practice-based evidence can be evidence for and how it can be 
used responsibly in policy deliberations. Instead of (or in addition to) using practice-based evidence 
to improve implementation or gain evidence of general effectiveness, educators should use it for 
their predictions. Reporting on variation in outcomes and trying to determine which local variables 
made the difference can be very useful for learning what conditions affect the effectiveness of 
particular interventions. But we cannot use knowledge from practice to neutralize sources of 
variability, making interventions work reliably across contexts. Nor can we rely on the accumulated 
knowledge as an inductive base that warrants conclusions about other targets on its own. A large 
and varied evidence base cannot warrant a prediction without further premises supporting the claim 
that the results will travel. Even then, induction provides weak evidence compared to premises that 
speak to the local structure and the support factors needed there.  
The upshot is that collecting and disseminating results and practical knowledge through 
NICs and other knowledge mobilization networks can help to close the gap between research and 
practice if educators use the evidence to make predictions rather than continuing to abide by the 
standard division of labor. Whether it comes from educators or researchers, predictions require 
information about the conditions that affect effectiveness no matter what intervention is under 
consideration. Of course, not all information obtained this way will be equally reliable. Responding 
to the suggestion that individual craft knowledge or knowledge from action-research can be 
coordinated and compiled to provide a useful, evidence-based body of professional knowledge that 
educators can use to improve their practice, Nuthall (2004) points out that “what is going on in a 
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classroom that leads to student learning is more complex and difficult to disentangle than a teacher 
has time to record, analyze, and interpret” (p. 292). Additionally, educators’ interpretations may be 
influenced by biases, leading them to pass on inaccurate, or potentially harmful, information.  
Causal ascriptions and explanations can be true or false and the reasoning offered in support 
can be better or worse. Well-warranted predictions require premises that are supported by strong 
evidence. The relevant information is difficult to assess rigorously. As such, to make good use of 
alternative research types and reports from practice we need mechanisms for evaluating the claims. 
It seems that the WWC and similar databases could be well-positioned to evaluate and 
disseminate these resources. Currently, the WWC includes only original research from RCTs or 
quasi-experimental studies. Much of what we and others are recommending is secondary research, 
including conceptualization and theorizing. For example, reports about successful and failed 
attempts to use an intervention in practice do not currently qualify as ‘evidence’ by their standards. 
Reports about individual cases and various alternative forms of educational research can be found 
on blogs, websites, or in academic journals. These are ineffective channels both because they are 
inconsistently accessed and because some lack credibility. Even if NICs provide better avenues for 
sharing results, knowledge transmitted that way could be misleading. Databases could evaluate these 
materials and organize them according to research type. They could also communicate how 
particular resources might be useful and how they should not be used in predictions. The last thing 
we want to do is bombard educators with more information without guidance for how to use it 
alongside experimental research and their own local knowledge in deliberations about policy and 
practice.  
Conclusion 
We attribute the persistent gap between what worked in research and what works in practice 
in part to lack of support for the effectiveness planning and prediction central to the standard EBE 
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model.  We distinguish between three kinds of causal claims: causal ascriptions, general effectiveness 
claims, and effectiveness predictions. We argue that, at best, educational RCTs evidence causal 
ascriptions, which, without further assumptions, are irrelevant to general effectiveness claims and 
effectiveness predictions. Because general effectiveness claims are not essential for predictions and 
are difficult to establish, we propose a serious rethinking of the EBE model to figure out how better 
to produce evidence and theory relevant to effectiveness predictions directly. Recognizing the sort 
of considerations that are necessary to support local predictions suggests a far broader, context-
centered research agenda. Additionally, materials for decision-makers should highlight local planning 
and prediction as an indispensable step. 
 Examining other recent strategies for addressing the research-practice gap, we find that they 
can be helpful for facilitating our proposal but are not, on their own, enough to bridge the gap. If 
the planning and prediction phase remains invisible, educators invited to collaborate with 
researchers are unlikely to request the information most relevant to their predictions. Educators can 
surely influence research agendas by identifying widespread problems. Research that investigates 
those problems will be relevant to practice in a topical sense. But, bridging the gap between research 
and practice requires more than topically relevant research or more detailed plans for 
implementation and adaptation—it requires research that is relevant to local effectiveness 
predictions.   
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1. For example, Brown, Schildkamp & Hubers (2017) suggest integrating local knowledge with 
rigorous evidence of effectiveness, Bryk (2015) calls for networks wherein educators share 
information they learn in the course of implementing evidence-based interventions, and Jinfa Cai, et 
al., (2017) urge researchers to “offer information on effective ways to implement” effective 
interventions (p. 345). In Section IV, we consider these proposals in more detail.  
2. See Cartwright and Hardie (2012) for the general structure of this frame; for essential components 
see Rothman (1976) on ‘support’ factors and Bechtel & Abrahamson (2005) on underlying structure. 
3. EBE, in its current form, may have arisen from disputed positivist doctrines, but that doesn’t 
mean that all versions of EBE owe what justification they have to those doctrines. Thus, instead of 
targeting the doctrines taken to motivate EBE, as many have done, we directly address problems 
present within EBE. See Kvernbekk (2016) for an excellent discussion distinguishing the necessary 
attributes of EBE as a basic concept from the attributes attached to particular conceptions of EBE, 
like the dominant ‘what works’ model. 
4. For a general discussion of context-centered versus intervention-centered approaches, see 
Cartwright (2019), or the extended discussion of context centering in the area of international HIV 
Aids policies in Seckinelgin (2017), much of which applies to education. 
5. We cannot account for what makes theory credible with any precision in the abstract. However, 
academic standards and expertise on the part of theorists in relevant fields could be used to assess 
theory.  
6. This is the average of the ‘individual treatment effects’ of the individuals in the study population, 
i.e., how much difference the intervention would make to the individual supposing all other causes 
of the outcome were the same. Amazingly, RCTs allow for an estimate of the average of individual 
treatment effects even though we cannot measure these counterfactual values themselves. For more 
on this see Rubin (1974).  
7. More technically, if randomization, blinding, and other post-random-assignment policing succeed 
in ensuring the intervention is probabilistically independent in the mean from the net effect of all 
‘other’ causes of the outcome, the difference in means between intervention and control groups will 
be an unbiased estimate of the average intervention effect in the study population – which can be far 
from a correct (or ‘precise’) estimate. For more on unbiasedness versus precision in RCTs, see 
Deaton & Cartwright (2018). 
8. Simpson (2017) notices that ‘strong evidence of positive effects’ is commonly misinterpreted to 
mean ‘evidence of strong positive effects.’ 
9. As Frances Bacon taught in 1620, “Induction by simple enumeration is puerile.” (NO I:105)  
10. As with the estimates of average treatment effect in an RCT on a study population, the estimate 
should be better as the size of the sample increases, but the problem never goes away entirely. 
11. School effectiveness research has been subject to some criticism, especially by advocates of using 
research evidence to inform education policy. See for example Coe & Fitz-Gibbon (1998), Brown, et 
al. (1997), Goldstein & Woodhouse (2000). We do not rely on this research in a substantial way, nor 
are we claiming that it should inform policy. Rather, we take the enterprise and its general 
observations to indicate that schools, although not wholly independent of one another and the 
broader education system, differ in ways that may bear on the performance of educational 
interventions in some cases. Thus, we should not assume differences between study and target 
schools are negligible when assessing generalizability. For more on assumptions about 
representativeness see Joyce (2019). 
12. The distinction between structural features on the one hand and support factors and derailers on 
the other is not a hard and fast one. But it is useful to separate factors that are deeply entrenched 
and difficult for the relevant educators to change – which Munro, et al. (2016) label ‘structural’ – 
from ones that educators can more readily change or substitute for (like by an after-school 
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homework club where students from distant homes can work together) – which they label ‘support 
factors’ and ‘derailers’. 
13. The Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015 created programs to support innovations developed 
locally by educators. For example, the Education Innovation and Research Program (ESSA, sec. 
4611) provides funding for “evidence-based, field-initiated innovations” that can be scaled-up to 
help more students.  
14. The U.S. Institute for Education Sciences has introduced programs that encourage RPPs.   
15. These are the University of California, Los Angeles, UC Berkeley, UC San Diego, and UC Davis. 
16. See the Center for Educational Partnerships website: cep.berkeley.edu/cal-prep.  
17. As Adrian Simpson noted in commenting on a draft of this paper (personal communication, 
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